Description of Individual Course Units
Course Unit CodeCourse Unit TitleType of Course UnitYear of StudySemesterNumber of ECTS Credits
11320103T11742INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORYElective365
Level of Course Unit
First Cycle
Language of Instruction
Turkish
Objectives of the Course
This theory course seeks to promote methodological thinking. Through careful examinations of crucial game concepts and close analyses of one or more games, participants will learn to understand game elements and their function.
Name of Lecturer(s)
Learning Outcomes
1To be able to understand concept and elements of game theory.
2To be able formulate mathematical function of game theory models.
3To be able to analyze relation between economic agent in the game theory frame.
4To be able to follow game theory literature.
Mode of Delivery
Face to Face
Prerequisites and co-requisities
None
Recommended Optional Programme Components
None
Course Contents
To describe, classification, and formulate of the games, Zero-sum game, positive-sum game and repeated games, Solutions of games: minimax and maximin, Static Games of Complete Information, Normal form representation of games and Nash Equilibrium, Definition of Nash Equilibrium and Dominated Strategies, Mixed Strategies and Equilibrium, Dynamic Games of Complete Information, Two-stage games of complete but Imperfect Information, Two-stage repeated games, Nash Equilibrium on repeated games.
Weekly Detailed Course Contents
WeekTheoreticalPracticeLaboratory
1To describe, classification, and formulate of the gamesReading
2Zero-sum game, positive-sum game and repeated games Solutions of games: minimax and maximin Reading
3Static Games of Complete Information Normal form representation of games and Nash Equilibrium, Definition of Nash Equilibrium and Dominated Strategies Reading
4Static Games of Complete Information Normal form representation of games and Nash Equilibrium, Definition of Nash Equilibrium and Dominated Strategies, Illustration: Cournot Model Reading
5Mixed Strategies and Equilibrium Mixed strategies, existence of Nash equilibrium and Dominated Strategies Reading
6Dynamic Games of Complete Information Dynamic games of complete and perfect information: Theory Stackelberg Model Reading
7Dynamic Games of Complete Information Two-stage games of complete but Imperfect Information: Theory Tariffs and International Competition Reading
8Midterm Exam
9Repeated Games Two-stage repeated games: Theory Infinitely repeated games Nash Equilibrium on repeated games Illustration: Collusion between Cournot Duopolists Efficiency wages and Time-consistent monetary policy Reading and research homework
10Repeated Games Two-stage repeated games: Theory Infinitely repeated games Nash Equilibrium on repeated games Illustration: Collusion between Cournot Duopolists Efficiency wages and Time-consistent monetary policy Reading and research homework
11Presentation and discussionPresentation and discussion
12Presentation and discussionPresentation and discussion
13Presentation and discussionPresentation and discussion
14Presentation and discussionPresentation and discussion
15Presentation and discussionPresentation and discussion
16Final Exam
Recommended or Required Reading
Gibbons, Robert, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University 41, New Jersey,1992. Bakoğlu, H. Oyun Teorisi, Ege Üniversitesi Basımevi, Bornova- İzmir, 1991. Friedman, James,(1990) Game Theory with Applications to Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press. McMillan, John, (1992) Games, Strategies, and Managers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Osborne Martin J. (2004), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, New York
Planned Learning Activities and Teaching Methods
Activities are given in detail in the section of "Assessment Methods and Criteria" and "Workload Calculation"
Assessment Methods and Criteria
Term (or Year) Learning ActivitiesQuantityWeight
SUM0
End Of Term (or Year) Learning ActivitiesQuantityWeight
SUM0
SUM0
Work Placement(s)
None
Workload Calculation
ActivitiesNumberTime (hours)Total Work Load (hours)
Midterm Examination11222
Final Examination21242
Attending Lectures16348
Project Preparation8216
Self Study7214
Individual Study for Homework Problems818
TOTAL WORKLOAD (hours)150
Contribution of Learning Outcomes to Programme Outcomes
PO
1
PO
2
PO
3
PO
4
PO
5
PO
6
PO
7
PO
8
PO
9
PO
10
LO1       423
LO223 4      
LO35   4 53 4
LO45    5    
* Contribution Level : 1 Very low 2 Low 3 Medium 4 High 5 Very High
 
Ege University, Bornova - İzmir / TURKEY • Phone: +90 232 311 10 10 • e-mail: intrec@mail.ege.edu.tr